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Michael R.T. Macnair, The Law of Proof in Early Modern Equity, Comparative Studies in
Continental and Anglo-American Legal History, Band 20, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1999,
322 p., ISBN 3-428-09198-1
For a long time it seemed that the history of the law of procedure was mainly the domain of
German and Italian scholars. Currently, this situation is changing. Within the last decade or
so, various important studies in this field have been published by legal historians from other
countries. Among the more recent are a study by W. Litewski on the roman-canon law of civil
procedure of the oldest ordines iudiciarii (on which a review will be published in a
forthcoming issue of the Legal History Review), as well as the study by Dr. Michael Macnair,
which is the subject of the present review. (It should be noted that I use civilian categories
when classifying Dr. Macnair’s study as being procedural in nature, since evidence is
categorised as a separate branch of the law in common law jurisdictions).
The Law of Proof in Early Modern Equity is important not only from the perspective of legal
history, but also from the perspective of the present debate in the European Union and outside
as regards the approximation of civil procedure. Within the European Union first steps
towards approximation were taken by the Working Group chaired by Professor Marcel
Storme from Ghent. This Working Group published a report entitled Approximation of
Judiciary Law in the European Union. Approximation on an even larger scale is envisaged by
the Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure, which are currently being
developed by UNIDROIT. Dr. Macnair’s book is very valuable with respect to both
initiatives, not the least because it discusses early modern mechanisms of convergence
between the laws of procedure of common law and civil law jurisdictions.
In his study, the author investigates the traditional position that strict rules on the
admissability of proof of facts in modern common law jurisdictions originate in trial by jury.
This position has been advocated by the older historians of law and, indeed, seems plausible
due to the absence of such strict rules in modern civil law jurisdictions. The absence of strict
rules on proof in the latter jurisdictions is usually explained by the absence of lay triers of fact
making up the jury as in common law jurisdictions. The author also addresses the relationship
between common law and civil law in early modern England and the role in this relationship
of the equity courts. The question is posed whether the traditional view that equity was the
vehicle for the reception of civil law ideas within the common law is correct.
In discussing these themes, the book follows contemporary discussions of proof and evidence
by both civilians and common lawyers: the instruments of proof are used as its organising
principle. Consequently, it deals with confessions (Chapter 2), documents (Chapters 3-4),
witnesses (Chapters 5-8) and burden and standard of proof and presumptions (Chapter 9). The
source material is mainly printed reports of cases with the occasional use of manuscript
materials. The period covered starts around 1550. Before this date there were no legal rules
governing the evidence presented to a jury. It ends in the first half of the eighteenth century,
when there was definitely ‘a law of evidence’ at common law. It should, however, be
remembered that the rules making up this ‘law of evidence’ do not necessarily coincide with
the modern rules since there was a mutation in the character of jury trial in the later eighteenth
century.
Althoughtrial by jury has long been advocated as the origin of the strict rules regarding the
proof of facts in common law jurisdictions, whereas equity was merely viewed as having
adopted these rules (it should be remembered that trial by jury was not a feature of courts of
equity), modern authors have criticised the traditional view. Some have stated that the
common law of evidence can better be explained by the intellectual culture of early modern
England and Europe and the place of the proof concepts of the contemporary civil and canon
laws within it. Others have held that a sufficient explanation may be found in the dynamics of
the common law trial of the late eighteenth century. According to Dr. Macnair, the missing
part in the traditional and modern explanations is the role of the English courts of equity and
their doctrine and procedure in relation to proof.
In his introductory Chapter, the author claims that the absence of strict rules of proof in civil
law jurisdictions does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the origin of these rules can
be found in trial by jury. It is indeed a known fact that the procedures on the continent, based
on the romano-canonical procedure, originally contained a great number of strict rules on
proof even though trial by jury was absent. This romano-canonical system of ‘legal proofs’
required the professional judge of facts to decide the case on an objectively fixed quantum of
proof. The system assigned to each type of proof a particular weight and it was the task of the
judge to determine whether the weight of the proof that had been administered added up to
full proof. Full proof could, for example, be administered by two independent concurring
witnesses of good character, the weight of a single witness consequently being 0,5. At the
time the law of evidence appeared at common law, the system of ‘legal proof’ was widely
observed within the civil law jurisdictions. This system only disappeared at the end of the
eighteenth century.
Having thus established that it is likely that other factors have contributed to the creation of
the law of evidence at common law, Dr. Macnair starts his search for these factors. Since the
author claims that the origins of the law of proof antedate the mid-eighteenth century, he can
leave aside the opinion of those authors who situate its origin in the dynamics of proof
concepts of the late eighteenth century (even though it must be acknowledged that many of
the modern rules of proof do originate in this period). The author does, however, have to
address the opinion of other scholars, who state that the true origin of the rules of proof may
be be found in the intellectual culture of early modern England and Europe and the place of
proof concepts of the contemporary civil and canon laws within it. Dr. Macnair agrees with
this point of view. He explains that in the early modern period the common law should be
viewed as local positive law, within the general hierarchy of laws accepted in later medieval
and early modern thought (the hierarchy being divine law, natural law, the law of nations and
positive law). Within this framework, he claims, the basic ideas of the law of proof were
considered to be of divine law, since they could be supported from the Bible. As such they
were binding on all tribunals whatever. Divine law as a source was later replaced by more
general natural law concepts drawn from the universal usages of nations. A substantial part of
these concepts was to be found in the civilian and theological literature. They did directly
influence the common law of proof. Partly this may have been due to the fact that courts of
equity aimed at offering relief against the defects of the common law. Some of these defects
were to be found in the existing rules of proof at common law (for example those concerning
common law estoppels and the absence of compulsion of witnesses). By reforming their proof
rules, common lawyers could prevent the intervention of equity courts and consequently
increase their business. The reforms included the introduction of a ‘natural law’ version of
proof concepts. A ‘natural law’ version of proof concepts lay ready at hand in civilian and
theologicalsources and was acceptable to common lawyers due to the above mentioned
hierarchy of laws in the early modern period.
Having explained that equity may have furnished an important pressure driving the
development of rules of evidence to a jury at common law, Dr. Macnair addresses the sources
of the ‘natural law’ version of proof used by the common lawyers. It has been suggested that
the common lawyers did not directly consult civilian and theological literature, but copied
‘civilian’ concepts of proof from equity. Equity may indeed have been the origin of these
concepts at common law since, according to Dr. Macnair, there are at least three reasons to
suppose that equity proof was a system which applied the general principles of the roman-
canon law of proof (although the author also claims that the rules of proof in equity were
certainly not equivalent to those of the roman-canon law). ‘The first is parallelism of content;
the second linguistic echoes; and the third instances of direct citation.’ (p. 289) There are
various instances in which rules indeed may have been copied by common lawyers from
equity (for example rules concerning ‘discovery’ and subpoenas ad testificandum). However,
in other areas the sources for equity proof doctrine largely begin at the same period as the first
steps in common law evidence doctrine (e.g. documentary originals, exceptions to witnesses)
and, consequently, equity cannot have been a source. According to Dr. Macnair, in the latter
areas there is direct or near-direct evidence of common lawyers referring directly to civilian
sources on proof matters. Apparently, the common lawyers ‘were perfectly capable of citing
civilian or theological sources for themselves ...’ (p. 38).
Apart from the role of equity and the civil law in the formation of rules of proof at common
law, the author discusses the manner in which the common law of proof may have influenced
equity. A vehicle may have been the mechanism of the ‘feigned issue’. By way of this
mechanism issues of fact arising before the courts of equity could be sent to be tried by jury.
Its existence shows that ‘the relation between equity proof and common law trial over the
period [discussed in the present study, CHvR] is […] not a straightforward one either of
equity following rules developed at law to control the jury, or of complete independence, or of
the common law simply following existing developments in equity’ (p. 287).
In his concluding Chapter, the author asks the question whether common law systems vary
from civil law systems in having a system of rules of evidence arising from the historical role
of trial by jury. According to him, the answer is both yes and no. The author states: ‘It is ‘yes’
because it is reasonably clear that the introduction of rules of evidence subjected the jury to a
judicial control which had been absent in the later fourteenth, fifteenth and early sixteenth
centuries; and if [...] this change was partly driven by the pressure of equity intervention, that
pressure in turn was in part a response to the perceived problems of jury trial in the late
middle ages. It is ‘no’, however, at a more fundamental level. This is that judicial factfinding
in equity (and, indeed, at common law) was thought to be subject to rules governing the
nature and quantum of proof before rules of evidence were applied to jury trial; and, indeed,
many of the rules of evidence applied at law by 1700 appeared in equity sources before they
appeared at common law. Moreover, the idea that judicial fact-finding was subject to proof
rules, and many of the specific rules which came to be used, were shared with or drawn from
the civil law tradition. The creation of the law governing evidence to a jury was therefore in
its own time a convergence (albeit not a complete one) between the common and the civil
laws. The explanation of the difference which exists today is to be sought only partly in this
period; partly, and perhaps more significantly, it should be sought later in the history of the
two traditions, in the period of the abolition of the old law of proof in continental europe.’
Toconclude this review I would like to emphasise that Dr. Macnair has written a book which
is important for both historians of law and those involved in current attempts to harmonise the
law of civil procedure. The book forms an intelligent and historically accurate analysis of
early modern source material which sets the example for future studies in this field. In my
opinion, it should be part of the library of anyone interested in the relationship between
common law and civil law.
C.H. van Rhee
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